The Party System in India

by Prakash Sarangi

During the last two decades Indian parties and the party system have undergone remarkable changes. The changes are not simply in the number of parties or their relative strength. There has been a qualitative transformation in the manner in which each party perceives its role in politics and in its interaction with other political parties. The nationalist fervour of the aftermath of independence has given way to the realpolitik of governance, involving all the features of bargaining, negotiation and compromise. This paper is an attempt to understand and explain these changes. It would be argued that it is the structural transformations in the civil society which are primarily responsible for these changes and that these transformations in turn were brought about by the policy of economic liberalization.

Changes in the Political Parties

Political parties in an earlier era were primarily consensual in nature. There used to be a basic consensus on matters of policy and leadership.[1] There were, of course, factions and dissensions. But the overall image of a party was rarely questioned. Whenever the consensus broke down, either a party faced a split or a new consensus; therefore, a new image emerged. The Communist Party of India was split into two in 1964 and the Congress Party acquired a new image after 1969. Sometimes this consensus emerged from the grassroots level; at other times it was imposed from above. Occasionally, the thrill of being in power prevented the consensus from breaking down, or a slogan for ‘throwing the rascals out’ gave a boost to that consensus. We have seen how ‘anti-Congressism’ used to be a great cementing factor in many opposition parties in 1960s and 1970s.

Today the political parties in India are coalitional rather than consensual. No political party can claim to be a large monolith. Even the so called national parties are virtually coalitions of several state parties. The working of the Congress party’s state unit in West Bengal has nothing in common with that of Maharashtra, nor of Rajasthan with Tamil Nadu. In the recent elections, each state
unit was following its own electoral strategy depending on local considerations. The bargaining power of leaders or groups at the national level depends on their performance at the state and local levels. The same characterization is more or less true about other political parties as well. There is a great gulf between the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the north and in the south. The politics in the Janata Dal in Bihar has a different flavour compared to its units in Orissa or Karnataka. The working of Communist Party (Marxist) (CPM) in West Bengal or of Congress Party (Indira) (CPI) in Kerala, being important players in the respective states, determine their strategy at the national level. Coalitional characteristic of parties is not unique to the national level political parties. Even in the state level parties, one comes across multiple voices under a single banner. A Telugu Desam Party (TDP) in Andhra Pradesh has to accommodate interests and sentiments of its three regions, or of different districts within each region. Thus, bargaining and negotiating to maintain a party’s label by means of a coalition has become an important rule of the game.

Secondly, there is a lot of change in the way a party relates itself to the people. This situation, of course, follows from the coalitional nature of politics. It is politically difficult to maintain a grand coalition. In an earlier era of consensual politics, every political party tried to woo all sections of society, irrespective of caste, religion, community or class. In fact, projecting this ‘nationalist’ image and not that of any sectional interests was the prevailing style of politics. This is not to deny the fact that caste and other factors were part of the calculus of the electoral strategy. These calculations were generally taking place only in the back rooms and were not normally a party’s acknowledged policy. This holistic style of politics is replaced by a segmental style where one or a few sections of society are seen as integral parts of a political party.

The segmental style of politics has emerged after a long process of realignment of political forces in India. The process was initiated by Indira Gandhi’s style of politics. Her slogan, ‘garibi hatao’ attempted to create a coalition of poor and weaker sections of society, and ironically, the Congress party was outmanoeuvred in this game by other political parties. Each political party tried to be identified with specific cleavage groups. The game reached a climax with the implementation of the Mandal Commission report accepting a policy of reservation for backward castes. This led to a process of alignment of political forces on the basis of caste identity. Most of the traditional political parties, which believed in aggregative style of politics, did not quite know how to cope with this new development. At the same time, new political parties, such as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Samajwadi Party (SP) emerged, with the proclaimed objective of defending the interests of specific castes. Similarly an event like the demolition of Babri Masjid divided the parties into those who were defenders of Muslims and those who were not. The helpless position of the Congress party was quite noticeable. If poor people were supposed to be its main constituents, in a state like Uttar Pradesh, it lost its Dalit votes to BSP, and the Backward Classes (BC) and Muslim votes to SP.[2] Added to these issues, the czarist lifestyle of its ministers and leaders distanced the party from the common people. It lost its mantle even before it realised that the rules of the game were
Another aspect of this segmental politics is the emergence of regional parties. As the ‘national’ parties were getting weakened, their state units found it useful to whip up the local interests for electoral purposes. In those states where the single cleavage parties based on caste or religious lines were not strong enough, new state level parties emerged and the old ones consolidated their position. The Telugu Desam Party (TDP) in Andhra Pradesh, Assam Gana Parishad (AGP) in Assam, Shiv Sena in Maharashtra and Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIDMK) and Tamil Maanila Congress (TMC) in Tamil Nadu are examples. Their importance can be gauged from the pivotal role played by the ‘Federal Front’ in the formation of two recent United Front (UF) governments. One positive aspect of segmental politics is that the federal system, which was hitherto in the process of decay because of centralised parties, suddenly got a new lease on life. There is little doubt that during the next few decades, the nature of state politics would determine the nature of national politics.

Thirdly, political parties today are more pragmatic than ideological. During the earlier decades, each political party tried to locate itself in an ideological continuum. For example, the Congress party was regarded as a centrist party with some socialist leanings. There were, of course, many leftists and rightists in the party. But it maintained an overall centrist image. Similarly, a Swatantra party or the Jan Sangh had distinct rightist leanings. The Communist and Socialist parties maintained their distance from the rest. It was the perception of most of the parties that their ideological distance maximised their likely electoral pay-offs. But the distance need not be seen only in terms of a left-right continuum. Any other ideological distance which was useful for electoral purposes was sought to be maintained. For example, ‘anti-Congressism’ itself became an ideology for many opposition parties, until the Congress party lost its monopoly as the ruling party.

Now such ideological polarisations are on the decline. ‘Socialism’ has virtually disappeared from the political discourse. Except for CPI and CPM, no other political party is found to be using the term ‘socialism’. Even the commitment of these two parties seemed to be in doubt after they became partners in the United Front (UF) government, whether supporting from inside or outside. UF government’s economic policy has hardly any socialistic elements, and is virtually a continuation of the previous Congress government’s policy of economic liberalisation. Therefore, almost all the political parties today, excepting perhaps CPI and CPM, hover around the same right-of-center space in the left-right continuum, despite each one’s familiar slogan to defend the interests of the poor.

Ideological depolarisation has other implications as well. Every party becomes a pragmatic party from the electoral point of view. The political parties take certain positions keeping the electoral returns in mind. If necessary, ideology is sacrificed. When ideological polarisation becomes irrelevant, mobilisation of support using other social cleavages which are electorally salient tends to rise.
Therefore, it is not surprising that we find today many political parties openly allying with specific caste or religious groups and trying to promote regional and local interests. In short, political parties in India are gradually transforming from policy oriented parties to ‘office-seeking’ parties.

Changes in the Party System

Along with the changes in the nature of parties, there is a qualitative change in the nature of party competition as well. One perceptive observer of Indian politics argues that Indian polity has reached a ‘post-Congress’ phase.[3] For the better part of independent India’s political history, the Congress party has been a reference point in the analysis of the party system. In the first two decades, it was the Congress party’s dominance and, in the next two decades, it was the nature of opposition to the Congress Party which defined the party system. But since the late 1980s, the sharp decline of the Congress Party has resulted in a transformation of the system. The decline of the Congress Party is not simply evident in the electoral returns, but more importantly, in the way the party and its leaders perceive their role in the political process. This has redefined the grammar of party competition in India. As Yadav observes, “The Indian party system is undergoing institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation simultaneously. On the one hand, the reach of the parties has increased and their capacity to draw allegiance, expanded at the expense of non-party competitors. On the other hand, the depth or the intensity of the allegiance has been very sharply undermined, reducing the act of voting for parties to an instrumental moment.”[4]

Party competition in India has to be conceptualised now in a multidimensional space. A political space can be seen as a simple cognitive device or label that assists the average voter in making sense of the party system. On one side, the dimensions of this space in India are expanding; but on the other side, its domain is collapsing. The traditional notion of party competition based on one-dimensional distinction in the left-right or liberal-conservative continuum is of limited relevance in the present context. Other dimensions which have become politically relevant include: secular/communal, casteless/casteist, rural/urban, integrationist/ethnic, national/regional/local, democratic/authoritarian, among others. These dimensions of cleavage are expanding so rapidly and distinctively that it is not easy to compress them to a unidimensional space.[5] For example, during the last few years issues concerning gender, especially for reservations in political and administrative positions, have become politically salient and each political party will have to take specific position on this dimension as well. All these cleavages, separately and together, help organise the issues and create party images and identifications.

The domain of the multidimensional space of the party system is collapsing from national to regional or even local boundaries. Each state can be visualised as a miniature party system. Sometimes even a big city, a region or a district might have its own party dynamics. In many states, including Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and Rajasthan, only two parties dominate the electoral scene, though they are not the same political parties in
every state. Even dimensions of party cleavages vary from state to state. While in Assam ethnicity and regionalism are politically important cleavages, in Uttar Pradesh religion and caste are of primary importance. The political distance between the Congress party and Janata Dal in Bihar may be quite remarkable, but in Orissa the difference between the two may not be all that great. Therefore, one has to reverse the centre of analysis for a proper understanding of today’s Indian party system, as it is the peripheries which have become the political centres.

One needs to locate each political party’s position in this multidimensional space. This exercise is not going to be easy for two reasons. One, each political party is constantly trying to redefine its position in each dimension depending on anticipated electoral support. For example, the Congress party projected itself as a secular party until the early 1980s. Then it acquired a pro-Hindu image. But after the Babri Masjid episode it has been trying to reestablish its secular credentials. Similarly, the Janata Dal claims to be secular, but during the 1996 elections, when the chief of Jama Masjid issued a fatwa for the Muslims to vote for their party, its leaders did not consider it proper to protest against it. The BJP has an image of an upper caste, urban-oriented party, but is trying its best to find a niche for itself among lower caste and rural populations. A second problem in identifying a party’s distance from the others lies in the spatial distinctions within each party. As mentioned in the last section, each national party is a coalition of its regional and local constituents. The Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh or Bihar may have an image of an upper caste party, but its units in Maharashtra or Orissa may have a different image. The Congress Party’s position on ethnic issues in the Uttaranchal region in U.P. is different from its stand in the rest of the state. The Congress Party in Maharashtra emphasises its rural dimension, while its West Bengal counterpart is identified with the urban-dwellers. Such examples can be multiplied, but the main point is that the fluidity in the contemporary Indian party system makes any assessment of party competition very difficult.

One could, therefore, characterise the party system in India today as one of segmented pluralism. It has three distinct features. First, there is multiplicity of parties with varying strengths. These include the national, regional and local parties. The number of political parties are to be counted not simply by the label they use, but also by looking at the effective number of party units, i.e., by disentangling the intra-party coalitions that each party label seeks to hide. Therefore, the number of political parties are more numerous than what is mentioned in the Election Commission’s list. The strength of each party has to be carefully assessed. Each political party might be weaker than what the election results suggest. The effective fractionalisation of party system is much higher than a mechanical counting of scores.

Secondly, the party system is segmental, but not polarised. The ideological distance among the parties is minimal. As mentioned in the last section, there is a trend towards depolarisation. Though they have come closer ideologically, the distance in the sphere of other cleavages has increased. This distance, and therefore competition, is determined by a multidimensional pattern of cleavages.
But survival of most of the parties depends on their appeal to one or a few segments of the population, based on caste, religion, etc. A positive aspect of this development is that some of the groups or interests which were earlier marginalised could find enough space for themselves within the party system. They have acquired a new bargaining power which was earlier suppressed in monolithic parties.

Thirdly, the party system is generally centrifugal rather than centripetal. There is a trend towards regionalisation of the party system. Several regional parties have emerged and have become electorally important, and the national parties have tended to view their regional units as the focal points in inter-party competition. A process of decentering of the party system has started. State-based leaders like Sharad Pawar or K. P. Karunakaran in the Congress Party, Jyoti Basu in CPM or Lalu Prasad Yadav in Janata Dal have acquired prominence in national politics. Even a person who had virtually no experience in national politics, like H. D. Deve Gowda, could become a prime minister.

Segmented pluralism in the Indian party system gradually evolved during the last ten or fifteen years. Like any other political phenomenon, this change is a reflection of several transformations taking place in the Indian society. The emerging political culture is perhaps shaped by a new type of social relation influenced by the policy of economic liberalisation. Three features of economic liberalisation are important for our understanding of formations like political parties: openness of economy and therefore exposure to the processes of globalisation; gradual withdrawal of the state from the developmental programs, forcing the civil society to confront the market forces; and the empowerment of citizens as a result of an overall climate of competition.

Globalised Economy and Localised Parties

While the Indian economy becomes increasingly globalised, politics and parties are getting localised, conforming to the saying: ‘think globally and act locally’. Many of the issues which concern common people—issues like poverty, health and environment which for obvious reasons are electorally salient issues—have been the concern of the nation-state. In an era of liberalised economy the state is gradually withdrawing from these areas with the presumption that these are the agendas of inter-state or global policy processes. But in the Indian context, many of these problems are comprehensible primarily at the local, not the global, level. It is only localised and decentralised actions which can search for solutions. The organisation of these actions, through movements, groups or political parties, tend to get localised.

In a way, globalisation generates localisation. New technologies of transportation and communication have tried to unify the space, but they have also produced many small worlds. For political parties who have to play an electoral game, these ‘imagined worlds’ are important parameters of their success. Therefore, the collapse of spatial barriers leading to the homogenization of the world community has few takers in politics. On the contrary, they tend to sensitise the population to the meaning of their own local space—its social, physical and
cultural attributes. Political parties tend to create new images of their own spheres of influence. These images create a distinctive atmosphere for new political identities to emerge. Therefore, an Indian identity collapses to an Assamese identity or Telugu identity. Then an Assamese identity creates a Bodo identity or a Telugu identity leads to an awareness of Telangana’s problems. Political formations which are able to arouse these local and regional identities become electorally successful, as can be found in the case of Assam Gana Parishad and several small groups in the North East, Jharkhand Mukti Morcha in Bihar, Telugu Desam Party in Andhra Pradesh, Dravida Munnetra Kaajagam in Tamil Nadu, or Shiv Sena in Maharashtra. Even among the national parties, one wonders about the fate of Janata Dal in Orissa without arousing pan-Oriya nationalism or that of CPM in West Bengal without the Bengali bhadralok image.

Similarly, new political spaces have been created by arousing social or occupational identities. New political parties with explicitly declared objective of defending the interests of specific caste groups have emerged. Among those who have been successful in the recent past have been the Bahujan Samaj Party and the Samajwadi Party in Uttar Pradesh supported by the Dalits, and the backward castes, respectively. Similarly, the Janata Dal in Bihar has become identified with the backward castes and BJP with forward castes in the Hindi belt. Tikait’s peasants’ union also has a much potential to make a dent in Uttar Pradesh politics. There are numerous examples of such parties, big or small, successful or unsuccessful, throughout the country. However, in none of these cases, has a political party has emerged because of a demand from below or because of a social movement. The attempt to merge India in a globalised space created local spaces in the civil society. Each individual sought his identity in a narrow, local space in order to reveal how he is different from others. These sentiments were exploited by the political elites for whom the numbers are an important parameter in the bargaining game of democratic politics. The leaders or political formations, which were hitherto marginalised and suffocated within larger political parties, have acquired new vitality and resilience.

One should be wary, however, of any overenthusiasm on the part of political parties in exploiting the sentiments of a localised space. Competing images of a space, whether geographical or social, proliferate and tend to circulate very rapidly. All sorts of interests are concerned to make their spaces seem different from each other. If caste becomes the basis of organisation of political parties, every caste group which has numerical strength would demand a piece of the pie. Every region would encourage subregional sentiments. In fact, this type of fragmented pluralism has already surfaced in Indian politics. In Andhra Pradesh, the conflict between Malas and Madigas, two important Dalit communities in the state, has reached the point where there is a demand for each group’s quota within the scheme of reservations for scheduled castes. In the same state the old sentiment of Telangana as a deprived subregion has resurfaced. Vidarbha in Maharashtra, Uttarakhand in Uttar Pradesh and Bodoland in Assam have become important rallying points for political activists.
Retreating State and the Party System

A second reason for the changes in the party system is the transformation in the role of the Indian state in the wake of economic liberalisation. It is well known that the state has been withdrawing from developmental and welfare activities. This new situation has several implications for the party system. Traditionally in India the state has been the source of creative social action. It has initiated several programmes for poverty alleviation, provision of rural infrastructure, healthcare and education. ‘Development’ had itself become an ideology by 1960s and 1970s. Extreme slogans like ‘garibi hatao’ worked miracles in populist politics. In a country where the majority of voters are poor and deprived, a major agenda of electoral politics has been the welfare of these sections. Every political party’s electioneering centered around either what a party has done for the people, is likely to do if elected, or what other parties have not done when they were in power. In other words, ‘welfare’ and ‘development’ have been important agendas of all political parties in the electoral game. When these agendas were virtually withdrawn from electoral politics because the state was retreating from these spheres, most of the political parties did not even know how they would relate to the masses. What promises can they make for the common people when their own hands are tied? Promises of a bright future through structural adjustment is not going to cut much ice. In any case, economic liberalisation is often identified as pro-rich and pro-business. The argument that greater productivity and efficiency would trickle down is not always convincing.

In the absence of any ‘need-based’ agenda, political parties have tried to relate themselves to people through various primordial linkages, through the caste, linguistic, regional or religious groups. No ‘national’ party can afford to sustain itself through these ‘sectional’ interests. For example, the Congress Party today does not have any comprehensive welfare agenda for the entire country. Another ‘national’ party, the BJP, has to exploit the Hindu card to survive. Janata Dal, which takes pride in its role in the implementation of reservations for backward castes, does not have anything more to offer after the one point agenda was exhausted.

There is also another qualitative change in the way the parties relate to people. Earlier the party leaders used to argue that they ‘represented’ the interests of ‘the people’. Now, since the parties tend to represent the primordial interests, they seem to claim that they themselves are ‘the people’. On the one hand, this scenario has all the promise of the ultimate step in the democratisation of the marginalised groups. On the other hand, the parties and their leaders can afford to be very undemocratic and authoritarian, because their own interests are submerged in that of the group. Therefore, we find a Kanshi Ram behaving dictatorially in Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) or a Bal Thackeray being unconventional in Shiv Sena. Still persons like them survive as party leaders.

Further, withdrawal of the state because of economic liberalisation has been more pronounced at the central government level. The federal system in India
has some peculiarities, especially in the welfare sector. Most of the initiatives and funding come from the centre; but it is the state governments which implement them and perhaps take the credit. The latter might add a few of their own initiatives if they can afford them. Even in the case of natural calamities, like flood and drought, most of the relief money comes from the centre, but is spent by the states. The impact of this peculiarity on the party system was not visible until the same party was in control of the centre as well as most of the states. With the divergence of the two power structures from the 1980s onwards, one notices a new trend. Parties controlling the state governments attempt to display their own region-specific initiatives in welfare and developmental spheres. New local agendas are generated in electoral politics and other parties become obliged to react and take positions. In all these initiatives the centre’s contribution is generally underemphasised and is often submerged in the rhetoric of liberalisation. The phenomenal success of NTR in Andhra Pradesh can be attributed to this strategy of combining regionalism with welfarism. His welfare schemes like subsidised rice and cloth became so successful that his Telugu Desam Party could displace all other non-Congress parties in the politics of the state. No wonder that parties in other states have imitated his strategy and have succeeded.

**Empowerment of Citizens and the Party System**

During the last few decades, Indian democracy has become very mature. An average Indian voter, young or old, literate or illiterate, rich or poor, has understood the nuances of electoral politics. The aura of the freedom fighter has faded. In any case not many of them with a motto of public service have survived in politics. The realpolitik of governance and allocation of resources has taken precedence. The machine politics of a party accommodating interests of all sections of society is a thing of the past. Even a patron-client relationship has declined. Landless labourers and the rural poor do not feel obliged to vote according to the wishes of the village landlords. They have increasingly tried to make political parties be responsive to their needs. They have shown time and again that their vote cannot be taken for granted. The way the Congress Party was defeated in 1977, 1989 and 1996 or the opposition parties in 1980 and 1991, one has to admit an element of sophistication in the voting strategies of the Indian citizens. This sophistication is further confirmed in the numerous instances of two different political parties being elected to the center and the state respectively, by the same set of voters in the same election.

One has to admit, however, that there is a negative side of competitive politics. As the people have realised their bargaining power, their demands have also multiplied. The expectations from parties and leaders have increased manifold. Interests have crystallized in a manner making conflicts inevitable. As each group, organised or unorganised, has started demanding a larger share from the developmental pie, it has become increasingly difficult for political parties to fulfill these demands. On the one hand, funds for such allocations has gradually declined because of liberalisation policies. On the other hand, any allocation not
only fulfills the needs of one group, it also alienates others. It is a classic prisoners’ dilemma type of situation. This bargaining game is not the same as the earlier accommodative politics during the Nehru era. Several power brokers have also emerged and they are interested not simply in retaining power, but exchanging power for specific advantages. One may even suggest that political parties today are nothing but coalitions of individual political entrepreneurs. The political culture of bargaining and negotiation at various levels of the decision-making hierarchy has come to stay. Political parties as organisations have become primarily office-seeking groups rather than being guided by a public service motivation. This new political culture is going to redefine the very grammar of Indian politics.

**Conclusion**

In this article, I have tried to take a fresh look at the characteristics of Indian political parties and the party system during the contemporary times. I have argued that political parties today are coalitional rather than consensual, segmental rather than holistic, pragmatic rather than ideological. The party system is characterised as segmental pluralism. The explanation for these changes is traceable in the radical transformations taking place in the civil society—in the way individuals and groups perceive their roles as constitutive elements of a political community. The policy of economic liberalisation has acted as a catalyst in accelerating these changes in perceptions.

These changes, however, are not symptomatic of an impending crisis. One has to recognise the changes in India’s historical situation and redefine the substantive content of her civic and political life. As Partha Chatterjee writes, "In the context of the latest phase of the globalisation of the capital, we may well be witnessing an emerging opposition between modernity and democracy, *i.e.*, between civil society and political society."[6] Political parties of an earlier era could not perhaps provide secure foundations for a proper relationship between autonomous individual lives in society and the collective political domain of the state. The party system was so deeply identified with the state that a crisis of governability shook the foundation of the party system itself. There was a need for new forms of democratic institutions to mediate between the civil society and the state. There was enough space for reorientation of party system to take up this mediating role, thanks to the resilience of a mature political society in India.

The change in the party system in India is also an echo of the helpless condition of a modern liberal democratic order.[7] The state, instead of being an umpire which enforces the rules of the game of civil association, has itself become the most potent weapon in the political conflict for resources. As a result, the autonomy of the civil society was eroded. Hence, at the earliest possible opportunity after the Indian state showed the signs of withdrawal in the name of economic liberalisation, the civil society, through political parties, has tried to assert itself. The vision of a post-liberal democracy[8] has been reflected in these developments. It is presumed that radicalisation of democracy premised on the
acceptance of the plurality of cultures and discourses with new forms of political representation would encourage a socially responsive state system. When cultures and forms of life would come to interact deeply with one another and when Indians would find themselves in the cross-currents of many cultural traditions, a new constitutive element of Indian political community would emerge. In such a situation, the emerging scenario of the Indian party system, segmented pluralism, would add strength to a maturing democracy.

Notes

1. There have been many studies on this aspect of Indian parties and party system. Two of these which initiated the argument are, Rajni Kothari, "The Congress ‘System’ in India", Asian Survey (December 1964); and W. H. Morris-Jones, "Dominance and Dissent: Their Inter-relations in the Indian Party System", Government and Opposition (July-September, 1966). For a review of the conceptual aspect of party and party system, see Prakash Sarangi, "Party and Party System: A Conceptual Analysis," Political Science Review, XXIII, 1984.

2. James Manor argues that by the last phase of Mrs Gandhi’s Prime Ministership the Congress party had lost its secular identity and had become pro-Hindu for reasons of political strategy. He even reports that a sizable section of ex-RSS cadres were accommodated in the Congress fold during this period and during Rajiv Gandhi’s first couple of years of Prime Ministership. James Manor, "Parties and Party System" in Atul Kohli (ed), India’s Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).


4. Ibid.

5. See, for example, an attempt to convert the dimensions of space, Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 334-342.


7. For an analysis of different facets of this condition, see Prakash Sarangi, Liberal Theories of State: Contemporary Perspectives (New Delhi: Sterling, 1996).


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